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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions and legislation.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In a plurality opinion, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, upheld a trial court's jurisdiction over a post-judgment inter-
pleader in Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend.' The case
was "part of the debris from a falling-out between attorneys who worked
together on asbestos cases for almost twenty years."'2 The dispute be-
tween the law firm and Madeksho, who had left the firm, arose while a
case involving four of the firm's clients was on appeal.3 When the clients'
judgment was ultimately affirmed, and the asbestos defendant learned of
the attorneys' conflicting claims to an interest in the recovery, the defen-
dant filed an interpleader in the underlying case three days after the
Texas Supreme Court's mandate issued.4 After first disbursing the undis-
puted amounts to the clients, the trial court split the attorneys' share
equally between Madeksho, who was continuing to represent the clients,
and the firm.5 Madeksho and the clients appealed, claiming that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the interpleader or take
any other action beyond enforcing the mandate by ordering payment of
the entire judgment to the clients. 6
The plurality opinion analyzed at length the pronouncement of various
courts, including its own prior decisions, that a trial court has "no jurisdic-
tion" to do anything beyond the appellate mandate and concluded that it
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** B.S. University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
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1. Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend, 112 S.W.3d 679, 690 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
2. Id. at 681.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 682.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 682-83.
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could not be read literally. 7 The plurality reasoned that, while trial courts
clearly must obey the appellate mandates they receive, "[tlrial courts re-
tain their constitutional jurisdiction" to interpret the appellate mandates
they receive, and "[t]o perform duties collateral to and consistent with
those mandates."'8 Those duties include "adjudicat[ing] turnover disputes
... [and] consider[ing] motions for contempt and to enforce." Moreover,
the plurality emphasized the risk to judgment debtors in situations such
as that presented in Madeksho if a trial court could not adjudicate the
conflicting demands to the money they owe. 9 Thus, over a vigorous dis-
sent, and with one justice concurring only in the result, the court upheld
the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. 10
The proper disposition of a case when a plea to the jurisdiction is
granted was at issue in Ab-Tex Beverage Corp. v. Angelo State Univer-
sity." The appellant conceded that its claims were barred by sovereign
immunity, but complained that the proper relief was to abate the suit, not
to dismiss it. 12 The Austin Court of Appeals disagreed.13 According to
the court, since a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is not on the merits,
the appellant would be free to re-file the suit if it obtained legislative
permission to sue.1 4 Thus, it was not error to dismiss the case, rather than
abate it, until that time.15
The Dallas Court of Appeals in Meridien Hotels, Inc. v. LHO Financ-
ing Partnership I, L.P.16 held that a statutory county court had jurisdic-
tion to issue a writ of mandamus to a justice court to proceed to trial in a
forcible entry and detainer case. 17 The court noted that the Government
Code authorizes county courts to issue writs of mandamus,' 8 and the
Texas Supreme Court long ago recognized their authority to do so in mat-
ters within their jurisdiction. 19 Because "Dallas County's county courts
at law have an expanded amount-in-controversy jurisdiction," to the
point that it is co-extensive with the district courts, the Meridien court
concluded that the county courts at law also have jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus to the justice courts.20
7. Id. at 684-85.
8. Id. at 685.
9. Id. at 687-90.
10. Id. at 690.
11. Ab-Tex Beverage Corp. v. Angelo State Univ., 96 S.W.3d 683, 684 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, no pet.).
12. Id. at 685.
13. Id. at 687-88.
14. Id. The court did modify the trial court's order by deleting the "Mother Hubbard"
clause denying all relief not expressly granted to make clear that the judgment was not on
the merits. Id. at 686.
15. Id. at 687-88.
16. Meridien Hotels, Inc. v. LHO Fin. P'ship I, L.P., 97 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, pet. denied).
17. Id. at 737.
18. Id. at 736 (referencing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 25.0004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
19. Id. (noting Repka v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 542, 548, 186 S.W.2d 977, 980
(1945)).
20. Id. at 737.
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According to the Texas Supreme Court, the failure to join all persons
who have an interest in a suit does not "uniformly" constitute a jurisdic-
tional defect in a declaratory judgment action.2 1 In Simpson v. Afton
Oaks Civic Club, Inc.,22 however, the Texarkana Court of Appeals dis-
missed an appeal from a property owner's declaratory judgment action
against the property owners' association for lack of subject matter juris-
diction based on the failure to join the other property owners as parties.23
The court held that the failure to join the other property owners was a
jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of the suit because the rendition
of a declaratory judgment would clearly prejudice the unjoined property
owners' rights and interests. 2 4
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the issue of amendment of
a return of service after a default judgment in two cases during the Survey
period. In Vespa v. National Health Insurance Co.,25 the defendant filed a
restricted appeal six months after a default judgment was entered, argu-
ing that the return of service failed to show that service had been effectu-
ated in accordance with the trial court's order allowing substituted
service. 26 The plaintiff attempted to cure this defect by filing an amended
return of service. 27 The appellate court held that, under the Texas Su-
preme Court, a trial court cannot authorize an amendment to the return
of service after it has entered judgment.28 However, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals reached a seemingly contrary conclusion in Dawson v.
Briggs,29 a case decided several months later. The Dawson court held,
without any reference to Vespa, that the trial court had jurisdiction to
allow a post-default judgment amendment of the return of service, even
though the defendant had already filed a notice of appeal. 30 The court
distinguished as dicta the same supreme court authority it relied on in
Vespa.31 Instead, the court focused on the fact that the trial court entered
the order allowing amendment of the return during the time it still re-
tained plenary power.3 2
21. Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex.
1977).
22. Simpson v. Afton Oaks Civic Club, Inc., 117 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2003, no pet.).
23. Id. at 484.
24. Id. at 483-84.
25. Vespa v. Nat'l Health Ins. Co., 98 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no
pet.).
26. Id. at 751.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 752-53 (citing Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex.
1994)).
29. Dawson v. Briggs, 107 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
30. Id. at 745.
31. Id. at 746-47.
32. Id. at 745-46. This result was foreshadowed in the concurring opinion in Vespa
authored by Justice Livingston, who was also on the panel that decided Dawson. See
Vespa, 98 S.W.3d at 753 (Livingston, J., concurring).
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In Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care System,33 the named defendant,
Methodist Health Care System (the "System"), owned Methodist Hospi-
tal where the plaintiff was treated.34 One year after suit was filed, and
after limitations had expired, the System objected that it was not the
proper party and that the plaintiff should have sued the hospital.35 The
plaintiff then amended her petition to name the hospital as well, but did
not request or serve a new citation on the hospital. 36 The trial court dis-
missed the claims against the hospital without prejudice because it was
never served.37 The Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals con-
cluded that this was a case involving the misidentification of parties, al-
beit related entities, rather than misnomer, and a new citation was
required.38 Thus, although it was clearly troubled by the result, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the hospital.39
Once again, a number of cases during the Survey period grappled with
the question of whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in ef-
fecting service of citation so as to avoid a limitations defense.40 In Par-
sons v. Turley,41 for example, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff's reliance on an alleged oral agreement to postpone service did
not raise a fact issue on the question of reasonable diligence, since any
such "agreement is unenforceable under the rules of civil procedure. '4 2
And in Zacharie v. U.S. Natural Resources, Inc.,4 3 the San Antonio Court
of Appeals held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff did not diligently
pursue service of process where the requested citations sat unclaimed in
the district clerk's office for five and one-half months after the original
petition was filed.44
To support a default judgment against a corporation based on substi-
tuted service, the record must show that the plaintiff used reasonable dili-
gence in seeking to serve the corporation's registered agent at the
registered office. 45 The First District Houston Court of Appeals in In-
gram Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Bolt Manufacturing, Inc.46 interpreted this
33. Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 108 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. filed).




38. Id. at 570.
39. Id. at 571-72.
40. A plaintiff who files suit within the limitations period, but does not serve citation
until after limitations has run, must have exercised diligence in effecting service or his
claim will be time-barred. See Grant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990).
41. Parsons v. Turley, 109 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. filed).
42. Id. at 809 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 11). Accord Meza v. Hooker Contracting Co., 104
S.W.3d 111, 114-15 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
43. Zacharie v. U.S. Natural Res., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
no pet.).
44. Id. at 754-55.
45. See generally TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.11(b) (Vernon 2003).
46. Ingram Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Bolt Mfg., Inc., 121 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
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requirement quite narrowly where the defendant corporation had moved
from the address that was listed with the Secretary of State as its regis-
tered office. The court noted that the Texas Business Corporation Act
places an affirmative duty on corporations to notify the Secretary of State
of any change of its registered address. 47 Thus, the court held that the
plaintiff's one unsuccessful attempt to serve the registered agent at the
listed address constituted reasonable diligence, and the plaintiff could
thereafter resort to substituted service on the Secretary of State.48 The
court reached this conclusion, despite the fact that the plaintiff and its
counsel apparently knew where the defendant corporation's actual place
of business was, but did not attempt to serve the registered agent at that
address.49
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
The interplay between a special appearance and motion for new trial
was the issue for out-of-state defendants who defaulted in Reiff v. Roy.50
The defendants failed to answer even though they were aware of the suit,
and a default judgment was entered against them.51 Within thirty days,
however, they filed a special appearance and, subsequently, a motion for
new trial subject to their special appearance. 52 The trial court sustained
the special appearance, vacated the default judgment, and dismissed the
suit.53 On appeal, the plaintiff complained that the defendants had not
met one of the prongs of the familiar Craddock54 test for setting aside a
default judgment, namely that their failure to answer was an accident or
mistake. The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding
that "Craddock does not apply to situations in which a defaulting party
seeks to overturn a default judgment by timely filing a special appear-
ance" to contest jurisdiction.55
Most practitioners know to take great care to avoid waiving a special
appearance through the filing or presentation of any other motion or
pleading. In Allianz Risk Transfer (Bermuda) Limited v. S.J. Camp &
Co.,56 the unlucky defendant filed two separate instruments with the dis-
trict clerk-a special appearance and "a motion to transfer venue and
subject thereto, original answer."'57 The record was silent on which was
tendered to the clerk first, but the clerk file-stamped the special appear-
47. Id. at 33-34 (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art. 2.11(A) (Vernon 2003)).
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 35.
50. Reiff v. Roy, 115 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
51. Id. at 703.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
55. Reiff, 115 S.W.3d at 704.
56. Allianz Risk Transfer (Bermuda, Ltd. v. S.J. Camp & Co., 117 S.W.3d 92 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
57. Id. at 94.
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ance one minute after the motion to transfer and answer.58 The Tyler
Court of Appeals held that the defendant made a general appearance,
thereby waiving its jurisdictional challenge.59 In Lang v. Capital Resource
Investments, I and II, L.L.C.,60 on the other hand, the Dallas Court of
Appeals held that the defendant did not waive his special appearance by,
among other things, "allowing" the trial court to rule on his motion for
new trial first.61 The court noted that the defendant did not participate in
the hearing on the motion for new trial and objected to that motion being
ruled on first. The defendant was not required, beyond that, to ignore
questions raised by the trial court or refuse to approve the form of order
granting a new trial in order to avoid a waiver.62
After the defendants' special appearance was denied, the plaintiff in Le
v. Kilpatrick63 nonsuited the case.64 For reasons that are not apparent
from the Tyler Court of Appeal's opinion, the defendants nevertheless
appealed the denial of their special appearance.65 The defendants argued
that the denial of a special appearance, like a venue determination or
summary judgment on the merits, should not be vitiated by a nonsuit.66
The court disagreed and dismissed the appeal as moot.67
IV. VENUE
In Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, Inc. v. Hamrick,68 the Austin
Court of Appeals had the rare opportunity to address the scope and sub-
stance of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87(5).69 In this case, the plaintiffs
originally filed the action in San Saba County against the livestock show
and the superintendent of San Saba Independent School District.70
Thereafter, Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo moved to transfer venue
to either Harris County or Travis County on the grounds that Harris
County was the location of its principal place of business; that the alleged
58. Id. at 97.
59. Id.
60. Lang v. Capital Res. Invs., I & II, LLC, 102 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
61. Id. at 863-64.
62. Id. at 865.
63. Le v. Kilpatrick, 112 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
64. Id. at 633.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 635.
68. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.-
Austin, 2003, pet. denied).
69. If venue has been sustained as against a motion to transfer, or if an action
has been transferred to a proper county in response to a motion to transfer,
then no further motions to transfer shall be considered regardless of whether
the movant was a party to the prior proceedings or was added as a party
subsequent to the venue proceedings, unless the motion to transfer is based
on the grounds that an impartial trial cannot be had under Rules 257-259 or
on the ground of mandatory venue, provided that such claim was not availa-
ble to the other movant or movants.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(5).
70. Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d at 566.
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causes of action did not occur in San Saba County; that the allegations
regarding the Texas Education Agency ("TEA") should proceed in Travis
County; and that no mandatory or permissive exception authorized the
maintenance of the action in San Saba County.71 After filing an amended
motion and joining the TEA as a defendant, the parties agreed to transfer
venue to Travis County, and the trial court granted the motion to transfer
venue.
72
Thereafter, plaintiffs amended their petition to join the Texas A&M
University System Board of Regents and three additional defendants. 73
These defendants "moved to transfer venue from Travis County to Bra-
zos County, arguing that the Texas Torts Claim Act mandates venue in
the county where the events ... occurred. ' 74 The trial court overruled
the Texas A&M defendants' motion and, thereafter, plaintiffs non-suited
the only Travis County defendants. 75 Based on the foregoing, the original
defendants moved for a rehearing on their motion to transfer venue to
Harris County and the Texas A&M defendants moved for rehearing on
their motion to transfer venue to Brazos County. 76 The trial court over-
ruled both motions. 77 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion by strictly interpreting Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87(5) and
holding that "if an action has been transferred to a proper county in re-
sponse to a motion to transfer, then no further motions to transfer shall
be considered. '78
In My Caff-CCC Ltd. v. LunchStop, Inc. 79 the Dallas Court of Appeals
analyzed the scope and enforceability of forum selection clauses. My
Cafd filed suit in Texas, alleging breach of four different franchise agree-
ments.80 In response, LunchStop filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the
court did not have jurisdiction because of a forum selection clause con-
tained in the agreements. 81 The trial court found that the forum selection
clause was enforceable and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that
forum selection clauses are enforceable against the parties if "(1) the par-
ties have contractually consented to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of
another state, and (2) the other state recognizes the validity of such provi-
sions."'82 However, the court recognized that it was not bound by the









79. My Cafd-CCC Ltd. v. LunchStop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
80. Id. at 862-63.
81. Id. at 863.
82. Id. at 864, 867.
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witnesses strongly favor jurisdiction in a forum other than the forum cho-
sen by the parties.83 In this case, no public interest argument was as-
serted.84 Rather, My Caf6 argued, among other things, that the forum
selection clause did not apply because the agreements were fraudulently
induced. However, the court of appeals held that when the claims as-
serted in a lawsuit "arise out of the parties' contractual relations and im-
plicate the contract's terms, the forum selection clause will encompass all
the causes of action relating to the agreement," including a fraudulent
inducement claim.8 5
Finally, during the Survey period, the Texas Legislature passed the
Texas Omnibus Civil Justice Reform Bill HB4 ("HB4"). 86 Article 3 of
HB4 addresses venue and forum non conveniens and should be reviewed
by all practitioners. For example, in multiple plaintiff cases, the court can
no longer make a distinction between the original plaintiff(s) and ones
that were later joined or intervened. 87 In addition, a defendant previ-
ously did not have the right to an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's
decision that each plaintiff in a multiple plaintiff case independently es-
tablished venue. The defendant could appeal if the trial court determined
that venue was improper as to a plaintiff, but there nevertheless was an
essential need to have his claims joined in the case. 88 Now, the trial
court's decision is subject to interlocutory appeal regardless of whether it
is based on the venue determination or the joinder determination. Fi-
nally, with respect to forum non conveniens, a trial court no longer has
any discretion regarding whether to stay or dismiss the action if the court
otherwise finds the doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable:
If a court of this state, on written motion of a party, finds that the
interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties a claim or
action to which this section applies would be more properly heard in
a forum outside the state, this court shall decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and shall stay or
dismiss the claim or action.89
Accordingly, in future Survey periods, forum non conveniens may be-
come a more prominent topic.
V. PARTIES
HB4 addressed several class action issues and should be thoroughly
reviewed by trial practitioners. Most of the changes were designed to
make the class certification procedure more efficient and to keep litiga-
83. Id. at 864-65.
84. Id. at 865.
85. Id. at 866.
86. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
87. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a) (Vernon 2003).
88. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Goldston, 983 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1998, pet. dism'd by agr.).




tion expenses to a minimum until all certification issues are decided. For
example, prior to a certification decision, the trial court must now con-
sider and rule on pleas to the jurisdiction, wherein it is argued that a state
agency has primary or exclusive jurisdiction.90 Additionally, the Texas
Supreme Court now has jurisdiction to review the grant or denial of class
certification when it determines that inconsistent appellate decisions
should be "clarified" to remove "unnecessary uncertainty" in the law and
unfairness to litigants.91 Finally, all trial court proceedings are stayed
pending a ruling or interlocutory appeal of a class certification decision. 92
Prior to HB4, courts of appeal regularly reversed trial court certifica-
tions of classes. For example, in Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Joffrion,93 the
Tyler Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's certification for, among
other reasons, its failure to issue a certification order that complied with
Bernal.94 In Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle,95the Fourteenth District Hous-
ton Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's class certification because
(1) compliance with class action requirements must be demonstrated
rather than presumed; and (2) consideration of choice of the law ques-
tions in class actions may not be postponed until after certification.96
In Barcroft v. County of Fannin,97 the Texarkana Court of Appeals
considered whether an individual who filed suit as a "sovereign" had
standing and capacity. 98 The plaintiff sued Fannin County, the City of
Paris, and various public officials and peace officers because they alleg-
edly towed away some of his property, rifled his personal belongings, and
stole cash from his house. The defendants filed special exceptions assert-
ing that, among other things, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover be-
cause he was suing as a sovereign. 99 The trial court dismissed the action
with prejudice, holding the plaintiff had no standing and could not re-
cover in the capacity of a sovereign. 100 On appeal, the court noted the
distinction between standing to bring a suit and lack of capacity to re-
cover. 10 1 The court found that the plaintiff sought monetary damages
based on allegations of trespass and invasion and, therefore, met the bare
minimum necessary to demonstrate standing. 10 2 However, after provid-
ing a detailed analysis of the history of the use of "sovereign" capacity
dating back to the Civil War, the court determined that the plaintiff could
90. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 26.051(a) (Vernon 2003).
91. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(c), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
92. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
93. Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Joffrion, 116 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
94. Id. at 224 (citing Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000)).
95. Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, no pet.).
96. Id. at 351-52.
97. Barcroft v. County of Fannin, 118 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no
pet.).
98. Id. at 924.
99. Id. at 923-24.
100. Id. at 924.
101. Id. at 925.
102. Id. at 925-27.
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not assert his claims in that capacity. 0 3
VI. PLEADINGS
In Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc.,104 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals considered whether certain claims and parties had been dismissed
by an amended pleading. Fraud-Tech, Inc. ("FTI") filed suit against sev-
eral defendants who, in turn, filed an "Original Cross-Claim" against
Dean McGee and Robert Andrews, the founders of FTI. 10 5 Andrews
and McGee filed an answer and "counterclaim" to the defendants' cross-
claim, which included the following statement: "Cross-Defendants adopt,
individually and collectively, and incorporate by reference each and every
allegation and cause of action set forth in Plaintiff's Original Petition and
each and every amendment and/or supplement thereof and/or thereto as
if set forth herein at length verbatim.' 10 6 Subsequently, FTI filed a sixth
amended petition, which contained no reference or allegation concerning
McGee and Andrews.10 7 Based on the foregoing, the original defendants
argued, and the trial court found, that McGee and Andrews' "counter-
claims" against the original defendants were dismissed because (1)
neither McGee nor Andrews was listed as a party in the sixth amended
petition; (2) no allegations were made regarding McGee or Andrews; and
(3) the style of the case did not reference McGee or Andrews. 10 8 The
court of appeals reversed, however, holding that although parties to a suit
may be effectively dismissed by omitting their names from an amended
pleading, no cases "stand for the proposition that amended pleading of a
plaintiff [could] effectively dismiss the claims and/or counterclaims be-
tween a third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant."' 0 9
In CHCA East Houston, L.P. v. Henderson,"0 the Fourteenth District
Houston Court of Appeals considered whether the "misidentification" of
a defendant is a question of standing or capacity. In this lease dispute,
the defendant's primary argument was that the plaintiff was not a party to
the first lease, had no assignment or other authority to apply lease pay-
ments, and therefore, was not a proper party to the lawsuit.1" The
court's determination as to whether to categorize the defense as one of
standing or capacity implicated whether the issue could be raised by ob-
jection or must be raised by verified pleading. The court concluded "that
misidentification among affiliated corporations or successors-in-interest is
103. Id. at 925-26.
104. Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc. 102 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.).
105. Id. at 371-72.
106. Id. at 372.
107. Id. at 375.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 376.
110. CHCA E. Houston, L.P. v. Henderson, 99 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
111. Id. at 632.
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an issue [of capacity] that must be raised by a verified pleading."' 112 Oth-
erwise, the court believed that treating the problem as a standing com-
plaint risks substantial waste of time and resources, as standing could be
raised long after the trial is over.11 3
Finally, HB4 impacted the pleading requirements with respect to "re-
sponsible third parties. '114 In particular, in order to seek submission of a
third party's comparative responsibility to the jury, a defendant can now
simply identify or designate such third party in its answer. 115 It is no
longer necessary for the defendant to join the responsible person as an
actual party to the suit.
VII. DISCOVERY
Discovery disputes provided fodder for numerous appellate decisions,
including several Texas Supreme Court opinions, during the Survey pe-
riod. The supreme court revisited the trade secret status of a tire manu-
facturer's "skim stock" formula in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.116 The
supreme court reiterated its holding in In re Continental General Tire,
Inc." 7 that, where the plaintiffs were seeking discovery of what all parties
conceded was a trade secret, "they were required to establish that the
information was necessary or essential to a fair adjudication of the case,
weighing the ... need for the information against the potential harm" to
the party resisting discovery. 11 8 The supreme court concluded that the
plaintiffs' evidence of unfairness was essentially no different than the evi-
dence presented in Continental General and, therefore, ordered that the
manufacturer would not be required to disclose the formula.1 1 9 In an
opinion concurring in the result, Justice O'Neill chided the majority for
failing to give the trial bench and bar better guidance in determining what
evidence would meet the fair adjudication test articulated by the court.120
Justice O'Neill then went on to identify several guiding principles gleaned
from trade secret cases in Texas and elsewhere that, while not authorita-
tive, should provide practitioners with a starting point.1 2'
The Texas Supreme Court got another chance to apply the Continental
General test, in a different manner, in In re Bass.122 The plaintiff royalty
112. Id. at 632-33.
113. Id. at 633.
114. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
115. Id. § 33.004(a), (j).
116. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
117. In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
118. Bridgestone/Firestone, 106 S.W.3d at 732 (citing Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d
at 613).
119. Id. at 734.
120. Id. at 734-35 (O'Neill, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 736 (noting, for example, that trade secrets should be discoverable "when
not allowing discovery would significantly impair a party's ability to establish or rebut a
material element of a claim or defense").
122. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). The court also clarified
in Bass that the six factors identified in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition for
determining whether a trade secret exists are relevant criteria for a court to consider, and a
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interest owners in that case sought production of seismic data, claiming it
was necessary for a fair adjudication of their claim that the mineral estate
owner breached his implied duty to develop the land. 123 The supreme
court rejected this argument, holding that the seismic data sought was not
material, much less essential, to the plaintiffs' case because the law did
not impose any such duty on the owner.124 It remains to be seen whether
trial judges will readily follow the supreme court's lead in scrutinizing the
viability of a party's claim or defense in this manner in deciding similar
discovery disputes.
The intermediate appellate courts also addressed a variety of privilege
issues during the Survey period. The San Antonio Court of Appeals in In
re Toyota Motor Corp.125 relied on federal case law in holding that a
binder of materials prepared for Toyota's attorneys for litigation purposes
was protected as work product, and therefore, the trial court should not
have split the binder apart and ordered the production of those portions
that otherwise would be discoverable. 126 In In re Jobe Concrete Products,
Inc. ,127 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the identity of participants
in a survey conducted by plaintiffs' expert witness was not protected by a
"human subjects protection privilege."'1 28 And in In re Lincoln Electric
Co.,129 the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded that the spirit, if not
the letter, of the rules governing privilege permitted a party responding
to a subpoena duces tecum to make objections to such things as vague-
ness, overbreadth, and relevance, to have these objections ruled upon,
and then to make any assertions of privilege at a later time. 130 In doing
so, the court relied on provisions of Rules 192131 and 193132 that evince a
bias against finding a privilege waiver to inform the proper interpretation
of Rules 196133 and 199,134 which arguably required all of the objections
and assertions of privilege to be made at the same time.135
The discoverability of privileged information reviewed by a testifying
expert was at issue in In re State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 136 In that
party is not required to establish all six factors in every case. Id. at 740 (citing RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 cmt. d (1995)).
123. Id. at 737.
124. Id. at 743-45.
125. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 94 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, orig.
proceeding).
126. Id. at 825-26.
127. In re Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., 101 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, orig.
proceeding).
128. Id. at 128.
129. In re Lincoln Elec. Co., 91 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, orig.
proceeding).
130. Id. at 437.
131. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.
133. TEX. R. CIv. P. 196.
134. TEX. R. CIv. P. 199.
135. Lincoln Elec. Co., 91 S.W.3d at 436-37.




case, State Farm designated two of its own employees as "non-retained
experts" who would express expert opinions regarding State Farm's han-
dling of plaintiff's claim. 137 When plaintiff sought discovery of privileged
documents that had been reviewed by one of the employees, State Farm
then "de-designated" them as experts. 138 The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals recognized that a party may de-designate an expert witness so long
as it is not part of a bargain between adversaries to suppress testimony or
for some other improper purpose. 139 Curiously, however, the court con-
cluded that State Farm's unilateral decision to de-designate its employee-
experts, who were likely fact witnesses in any event, was intended to con-
ceal their testimony and, therefore, was for an improper purpose.' 40 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that the privileged documents in dispute had
been generated as part of the underlying claim, not in connection with the
plaintiff's lawsuit against State Farm, and were not discoverable as docu-
ments prepared or reviewed by an expert witness in anticipation of his
testimony. 141
The Texas Supreme Court took an opportunity to provide guidance on
the subject of electronic discovery in In re CI Host, Inc.142 The plaintiffs
in that case sought production of computer backup tapes from CI Host, a
web-hosting company. 143 The trial court overruled CI Host's objections
based on the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act.1 44 The
Texas Supreme Court denied CI Host's request for mandamus relief be-
cause CI Host had not met its burden of supporting its objection with
evidence as required by the relevant procedural rules. 145 The supreme
court stated, however, that it was "loath" to allow CI Host to have waived
its customers' legitimate privacy rights by its failure to adhere to the dis-
covery rules.1 46 Accordingly, it denied the mandamus without prejudice
to allow the trial court and parties to give due consideration to those
privacy interests, whether by protective order or otherwise.147
In recent years, the Texas Supreme Court has intervened by mandamus
to rein in overbroad document requests. 148 In In re CSX Corp.,149 the
Texas Supreme Court provided similar guidance for the proper use of
interrogatories. The plaintiff in the underlying negligence action pro-
137. Id. at 339.
138. Id. at 339-40.
139. Id. at 340.
140. Id. at 341.
141. Id. at 343.
142. In re CI Host, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding).
143. Id. at 514-15.
144. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3121-3127 (West 2000); In re CI Host, 92
S.W.3d at 514.
145. Id. at 516-17.
146. Id. at 517.
147. Id.
148. See In re Sears Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2003) (orig. proceeding) (discussing supreme court's handling of overbroad document re-
quests in asbestos litigation).
149. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
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pounded three interrogatories requesting the identity of the corporate de-
fendants' safety and medical personnel going back over thirty years.150
The supreme court concluded that these interrogatories were overbroad
and rejected the plaintiff's argument that a broader scope of discovery
should be allowed in interrogatories than in document requests. 151 As
the supreme court phrased it, the "central consideration in determining
overbreadth is whether the request could have been more narrowly tai-
lored to avoid including tenuous information and still obtain the neces-
sary, pertinent information."' 52 Since plaintiff was asking for information
covering periods when he did not even work for defendants, the interrog-
atories were overbroad and the defendants' objections should have been
sustained. 153
The little-used motion for entry onto land was the subject of a case
decided during the Survey period. 154 Under Rule 196.7, 5-5 an order for
entry onto the property of a nonparty may only issue upon a showing of
"good cause" and only if the discovery is relevant to the cause of ac-
tion.156 The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Swepi, after finding that
the request for entry onto a nonparty's land was relevant to a defense
asserted in the case, defined good cause as being shown "where the mo-
vant establishes (1) the discovery sought is relevant and material, that is,
the information will in some way aid the movant in the preparation or
defense of the case; and (2) the substantial equivalent of the material
cannot be obtained through other means." 157
Finally, the propriety of severe discovery sanctions was at issue in
Spohn Hospital v. Mayer158 and Response Time, Inc. v. Sterling Com-
merce (North America), Inc.159 In Mayer, the defendant hospital failed to
timely produce witness statements it had taken from two nurses.1 60 On
the plaintiffs' motion, the trial court ordered as a sanction for the late
production that the facts contained in those witness statements be taken
as established and so instructed the jury.16' The Texas Supreme Court
analyzed this sanction under its familiar TransAmerican162 standard and
held that it failed to meet either prong of that test-i.e., (1) a sufficient
nexus between the offensive conduct, the offender, and the sanction im-
150. Id. at 151.
151. Id. at 152-53.
152. Id. at 153.
153. Id.
154. In re Swepi L.P., 103 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003) (orig.
proceeding).
155. TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.7.
156. TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.7(d).
157. Swepi, 103 S.W.3d at 584.
158. In re Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2003).
159. Response Time, Inc. v. Sterling Commerce (N. Am.), Inc., 95 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
160. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d at 880.
161. Id. at 881.




posed, and (2) no more severe than necessary to satisfy the legitimate
purposes of sanctions. 163 The Dallas Court of Appeals in Response Time,
on the other hand, had little difficulty in concluding that a litigant's per-
jury and fabrication of evidence justified the "death penalty" sanction of
striking the party's pleadings. 164
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In In re Estate of Swanson,165 the El Paso Court of Appeals abandoned
its prior holdings in Walton v. City of Midland166 and Walton v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. 167 and joined the several other appellate courts in holding
that, even where the non-movant does not object or respond to a defec-
tive no-evidence summary judgment motion, if the motion is either con-
clusory or fails to state the elements on which there is no evidence, the
non-movant may still challenge the motion on those grounds on ap-
peal.168 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Keszler v. Memorial
Medical Center of East Texas 169 held that a no-evidence motion for sum-
mary judgment is "fundamentally flawed when used against an adverse
party who would not have the burden of proof at trial on the element or
issue raised."' 70
IX. JURY PRACTICE
The Texas Supreme Court held in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v.
Bohall,171 that the trial court erred in entering a judgment based on a
verdict reached by a jury after it had been released and then recalled for
further deliberations following the discovery of a technical defect in the
jury charge. The supreme court rejected the trial court's rationale that,
because it had not "received the verdict," it was proper to have the panel
resume deliberations. 172 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court
noted that Rule 295 did not apply because the verdict itself was not defec-
tive. Only the charge was alleged to have contained an error. 173 Moreo-
ver, before recalling the jury for further deliberations, the trial court had
accepted the motion of one of the parties to receive the verdict and then
advised the panel that it was excused. 174
163. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d at 882-83.
164. Response Time, 95 S.W.3d at 660-63.
165. In re Estate of Swanson, No. 08-02-00154-CV, 2003 WL 22215240, at *1 (Tex.
App.-El Paso Sep. 25, 2003, no pet. h.).
166. Walton v. City of Midland, 24 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.).
167. Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet.
denied).
168. Swanson, 2003 WL 22215240, at *2.
169. Keszler v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 105 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no
pet.).
170. Id. at 125.
171. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Bohall, 114 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2003).
172. Id. at 44-45.




In Mercado v. Warner-Lambert Co.,1 7 5 one of the parties employed a
shadow jury to observe the trial. One of the shadow jurors asked an ac-
tual juror for a cigarette during a smoking break and for a quarter to
purchase a soft drink. The juror obliged. The First District Houston
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for new
trial based on juror misconduct, holding that, while the contact between
the actual juror and the shadow juror was improper, any harm that re-
sulted was not significant enough to warrant a new trial.176
Two cases during the Survey period held that trial courts erred in fail-
ing to grant parties a trial by jury. In Texas Valley Insurance Agency v.
Sweezy Construction, Inc.,177 the plaintiff properly requested a jury trial
in its initial and amended pleadings, but failed to pay the jury fee. The
trial court sent out subsequent announcements acknowledging that the
case was on the jury docket. By the time the trial court finally reached
the case nearly two years later, the plaintiff's pleadings no longer con-
tained a request for a jury trial, and the jury fee still had not been paid.
One of the parties then filed a jury request and paid the required fee;
however, the trial court refused to empanel a jury and heard the case
itself. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held this was error because
the trial court carried the case on its jury docket for more than a year and
a half. Under these circumstances, the parties "were entitled to rely on
the trial court's orders setting the case for jury trial, even in the absence
of the timely payment of a jury fee."'178
Similarly, in In re J.N.F.,179 a suit to terminate the parental rights of an
incarcerated father, the father originally filed an answer in which he re-
quested a jury trial. He also filed an uncontested declaration of inability
to pay costs. He then filed an amended pleading that did not mention the
request for a jury trial. The trial court refused to grant a jury trial, which
the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals held was error. In
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that the defen-
dant had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to request one in his
amended answer. 180
X. JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court issued several significant decisions during
the Survey period on the subject of proper jury charges. In Harris
County v. Smith,181 the supreme court reversed and remanded an action
in which it found that the trial court improperly submitted a broad-form
175. Mercado v. Warner-Lambert Co., 106 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
2003, pet. denied).
176. Id. at 397.
177. Tex. Valley Ins. Agency v. Sweezy Constr., Inc., 105 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
178. Id. at 219-21.
179. In re J.N.F., 116 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
180. Id.
181. Harris County v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002).
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question on damages that included elements for which there was no evi-
dentiary support. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court extended
the reasoning of Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel,18 2 which addressed
the improper submission of liability issues for which there was no evi-
dence, to jary questions regarding damages. The supreme court expressly
noted that it was not retreating from the mandate of broad form submis-
sions by its holding, but rather insuring that only proper elements of dam-
ages are presented to the jury for consideration.' 8 3
The Texas Supreme Court also gave guidance on the issue of spoliation
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson,184 holding that the trial court erred in
submitting such an instruction, which probably caused the rendition of an
improper verdict. In this personal injury case, inventory (a reindeer holi-
day decoration) fell on a customer who was then treated at the store and
left without further incident. The manager filled out an accident report,
and nothing was heard from the customer for six months until he filed
suit. By then, Wal-Mart had either sold or discarded the reindeer decora-
tion. The supreme court held that it was error to give the jury a spolia-
tion instruction regarding the decoration under these circumstances, since
there was no indication at the time of the indictment that the customer
would file suit, such that Wal-Mart should have actually preserved the
item for trial.185
The Texas Supreme Court in In re J.F. C.'8 6 declined to extend the fun-
damental error doctrine to allow objections to the jury charge to be
raised for the first time on appeal in a suit terminating the parent-child
relationship. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court held that
Rule 279, which permits a court to supply omitted findings, did not vio-
late the parents' due process rights, where the charge contained an error
regarding the instruction for terminating parental rights to which no ob-
jection was made at trial. 187
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran'88
reversed and remanded based on an error in the jury charge in a defective
seatbelt case. The jury was asked to apportion fault among two drivers
and the alleged defective seatbelt itself, rather than among the various
parties who had actually designed and manufactured the seatbelt. Since a
dispute existed between two of the parties regarding which was responsi-
ble for the alleged defect in the seatbelt, the court held that it was im-
proper to apportion responsibility to the seatbelt rather than the
parties. 189
182. Crown Life Ins. Co. v, Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000).
183. Smith, 96 S.W.3d at 235-36.
184. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2003).
185. Id. at 720, 722-24.
186. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002).
187. Id. at 272-75 (discussing TEX. R. Civ. P. 279).
188. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran, No. 13-00-00537-CV, 2003 WL 22014805, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2003, no pet.).
189. Id. at *1-2, 4.
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The First District Houston Court of Appeals in Vecellio Insurance
Agency, Inc. v. Vanguard Underwriting Insurance Co. 190 held that the trial
court committed reversible error by using the term "misconduct" in the
jury charge without giving proper instruction or clarification as to what
that term meant. 191
XI. JUDGMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court issued two opinions of note during the Sur-
vey period. In Naaman v. Grider,192 the Texas Supreme Court dismissed
an appeal as untimely because the appellant filed the notice of appeal
based upon the date the trial court granted the motion for judgment,
rather than the date of the judgment itself, which had been entered four
weeks earlier. 193 In In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd.,194 the Texas
Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in a real estate
dispute where the trial court failed to enforce a final judgment that had
been timely appealed, but had not been superseded.' 95
In City of Marshall v. Gonzales,196 although the trial court had initially
sent an order granting the city's plea to the jurisdiction, more than sev-
enty-five days later the court sent a letter indicating that the order grant-
ing the plea was signed in error and then signed an order denying the
city's plea to the jurisdiction. 197 Because the trial court's plenary jurisdic-
tion had expired, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to retract its original order.198 In so holding, the court
rejected the argument that the trial court's original order was not a final
judgment because it failed to address the city's request for costs. The
court noted that, although the Texas Supreme Court had not expressly
addressed the issue, other intermediate appellate courts had rejected this
argument. 99
An en banc panel from the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Ap-
peals held in In re Gillespie200 that a request for findings of fact and con-
clusions of law did not extend the trial court's plenary jurisdiction
because the request did not seek a substantive change to any ruling by the
trial court. Rather, the request sought an explanation of the trial court's
190. Vecellio Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Vanguard Underwriting Ins. Co., 127 S.W.3d 134 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet. h.).
191. Id. at 139.
192. Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2003).
193. Id. at 73-74.
194. In re Crow-Billingsly Air Park, Ltd., 98 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
195. Id. at 178-80.
196. City of Marshall v. Gonzales, 107 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no
pet.).
197. Id. at 801.
198. Id. at 805.
199. Id. at 803 (citing Thompson v. Beyer, 91 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no
pet.) (holding that a trial court is not required to assess costs for its judgment to be final)).




decision.20' In reaching this conclusion, the court overruled its prior hold-
ing in Electronic Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co.,20 2 that a request
for findings of fact and conclusions of law would extend the trial court's
plenary power.20 3
The First District Houston Court of Appeals in Rapp v. Mandell &
Wright, P.C.20 4 held that when a judgment creditor accepts full payment
of a judgment and acknowledges that it has been satisfied and released,
the judgment creditor may not appeal the judgment in its favor.20 5 In this
dispute among attorneys, a former shareholder sued his firm for breach
of contract and tort claims. Following a jury trial, the defendants ten-
dered payment in full to the plaintiff and obtained written release. Since
the plaintiff had unconditionally accepted the release, the appellate court
held that the appeal was moot and dismissed it.2 0 6
Courts again wrestled with the issues of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel during the Survey period. For example, in Welch v. Hrabar,20 7 the
Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals held that an expert wit-
ness was not precluded from suing her client to recover fees in a separate
contract action, even though she had intervened in the original underly-
ing action for which she had been retained. In particular, the court found
that the expert did not participate at trial, and hence the final judgment
entered in that case did not constitute res judicata or collateral estoppel
against her, since there had been no adjudication of the expert's claims on
the merits.208
In Heard v. Moore,20 9 the plaintiff, a passenger in a car, filed suit
against the defendants for personal injuries but did not name Nelson, the
driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was the passenger. The defend-
ants then joined the driver and obtained a default judgment against him,
which included a finding that the driver was the complete cause of the
damages alleged by the third-party plaintiffs/defendants, and thus liable
for the damages sought by the plaintiff. The defendants then severed
their claims against the driver and that judgment became final. Subse-
quently, the defendants successfully moved for summary judgment
against the plaintiff on the basis of res judicata. The Texarkana Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the action, holding that res judicata did
not preclude the plaintiff's claims against the defendants. In reaching this
conclusion, the court ruled that the plaintiff was not obligated to pursue
201. Id. at 704-05.
202. Elec. Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., 821 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
203. Gillespie, 124 S.W.3d at 703-04.
204. Rapp v. Mandell & Wright, P.C., 123 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. filed).
205. Id. at 435.
206. Id. at 436.
207. Welch v. Hrabar, 110 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied).
208. Id. at 607-08.
209. Heard v. Moore, 101 S.W. 3d 726 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
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her claims of indemnity and contribution against the driver in the original
action, since her claims against him were not mandatory under Rule
38(a).210
XII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In Moritz v. Preiss,211 the Texas Supreme Court reversed a decision
discussed in previous Surveys and held that the petitioner's amended mo-
tion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which was filed
more than thirty days after the final judgment was signed, was not timely.
Thus, the amended motion for new trial should not have been consid-
ered.212 The Dallas Court of Appeals held in Hawkins v. Howard 13 that
the trial court erred in refusing to hear evidence on a motion for new trial
challenging an agreed judgment entered pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment where one of the parties alleged fraudulent inducement. 214
The Houston appellate courts issued a trio of opinions of note during
the Survey period. In Coinmach, Inc. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp.
215
the First District Houston Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of
calculating the timeliness of a motion for new trial, the date the trial court
actually signed the judgment, rather than the date the clerk entered the
order, is the operative date.216 The First District Houston Court of Ap-
peals in In re Taylor217 held that a proposed order for new trial signed
after the trial court had lost its plenary power had expired was void; how-
ever, a subsequent order granting a motion to re-execute an original lost
document was permissible where it appeared that the trial court had
signed an appropriate order granting a new trial, but that order had then
been misplaced. 218 Finally, in Chambers Enterprises, Inc. v. 6250
WestPark, L.P.,219 the court held that a motion for new trial was not suffi-
cient to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction, absent a timely notice of
appeal.220
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
It is often broadly stated that a disqualified judge has no authority to
take any action in a case and his further rulings are void.221 In In re
210. Id. at 729.
211. Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003).
212. Id. at 720.
213. Hawkins v. Howard, 97 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
214. Id. at 678-79.
215. Coinmach, Inc. v. Aspenwood Apt. Corp., 98 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
216. Id. at 380.
217. In re Taylor, 113 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) (orig.
proceeding).
218. Id. at 389-90, 393.
219. Chambers Enters., Inc. v. 6250 WestPark, L.P., 97 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
220. Id. at 334.
221. See, e.g., In re Union Pac. Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998).
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Gonzalez,222 however, the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals
held that a disqualified trial judge's entry of an agreed order appointing a
visiting judge was not void. 223 The San Antonio Court of Appeals rea-
soned that, given the parties' agreement to have a particular visiting
judge hear the case, the entry of an order confirming his appointment was
a ministerial act.2 24 The court also held, however, that the disqualified
judge's subsequent decision transferring the case did involve the exercise
of discretion and was therefore void. 225
Parker v. Parker 26 involved the issue of whether a trial judge could
properly rescind an oral announcement that he was recusing himself. The
appellants asserted that the judge had left their counsel a voicemail mes-
sage recusing himself, which he then rescinded in a later written order
granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees.227 Relying on an
earlier court of appeals' opinion, the appellants argued that a clear and
unequivocal act constituting a recusal was irrevocable, regardless of
whether a formal order was entered. 228 The Parker court held, however,
that because appellants neither objected at the time of the order re-
scinding recusal nor filed a written motion to recuse the judge thereafter,
and because the only record evidence of the oral recusal was the order
rescinding it, appellants waived the issue of recusal on appeal. 229
Most trial practitioners are familiar with the procedure for objecting to
"visiting" or assigned judges. During the Survey period, the Seventy-
Eighth Legislature amended and clarified the applicable provisions of the
Government Code relating to the assignment of trial judges. An order of
assignment must now state whether the judge is an active, former, retired,
or senior judge.230 Additionally, the minimum service requirements for a
former or retired judge to be able to serve have been doubled. 231 The
new statute also extends the limitation of one objection per party to for-
mer judges, except for those who were defeated in the last primary or
general election in which they ran.232 Moreover, for purposes of ob-
jecting to a visiting judge, "party" includes multiple parties who are al-
igned in a case as determined by the presiding judge. 233
The timeliness of a party's objection to an assigned judge was at issue
222. In re Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).
223. Id. at 41.
224. Id. at 40-41.
225. Id. at 41-42.
226. Parker v. Parker, Nos. 2-02-312-CV, 02-313-CV, 2004 WL 221173, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth Feb. 5, 2004, no pet. h.).
227. Id. at *4.
228. Id. at *5 (citing Dunn v. County of Dallas, 794 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. App.?Dallas
1990, no writ)).
229. Id. at *4.
230. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
231. Id. § 74.055(c)(1) (requiring ninety-six months of service as an active judge).
232. Id. § 74.053(b)(d).
233. Id. § 74.053(g).
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in In re Naylor234 and In re Approximately $17,239.00.235 In the former
case, the real party in interest's objection to the assigned judge was un-
timely, but the judge nevertheless declined to hear the matter.2 36 The
Texarkana Court of Appeals denied the relator's petition for a writ of
mandamus, holding that there was nothing that compelled the assigned
judge to overrule the objection and remain in place as the trial judge.2 37
In the latter case, the relator timely filed an objection to the assigned
judge, but failed to present the objection when he appeared at the hear-
ing and found the assigned judge presiding.2 38 Under these circum-
stances, the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals concluded
that the objection had been waived and denied mandamus relief.239
In Davis v. Crist Industries, Inc.,240 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
overruled one of its own recent decisions in holding that the elected dis-
trict judge could resume authority over a case in her court despite the fact
that a visiting judge had already presided over the first several days of
trial.2 41 The prior case had held that the visiting judge's jurisdiction
under the assignment order was exclusive until terminated and that the
regular judge could not, therefore, take the case back and vacate the visit-
ing judge's orders. 242 In Davis, however, the court reasoned that the is-
sue was really one of authority, not jurisdiction, and held that more than
one judge may exercise authority over a single case.243 Since the lan-
guage in the assignment order did not give the assigned judge exclusive
authority over the case, nothing precluded the elected judge of the court
from re-asserting her own authority over a case pending in her court. 244
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
A legal assistant who went on to earn a law degree was at the center of
a disqualification battle in In re TXU U.S. Holdings Co.2 45 While work-
ing at one law firm, the legal assistant was involved in the representation
of TXU in various asbestos cases.2 46 Upon obtaining her law license, she
went to work for another firm, Waters & Kraus, L.L.P. As part of an
"Agreement Regarding Conflicts of Interest," the firms agreed that Wa-
234. In re Naylor, 120 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, orig. proceeding).
235. In re Approximately $17,239.00, No. 14-03-01177-CV, 2003 WL 22723429, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, Oct. 24, 2003, orig. proceeding).
236. Naylor, 120 S.W.3d at 501.
237. Id. at 501-02.
238. In re $17,239.00, 2003 WL 22723429 at *1.
239. Id. at *2.
240. Davis v. Crist Indus., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet.
denied).
241. Id. at 340 (overruling In re Cook Children's Med. Center, 33 S.W.3d 460 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding)).
242. Cook, 33 S.W.3d at 463.
243. Davis, 98 S.W.3d at 342-43.
244. Id.
245. In re TXU U.S. Holdings Co., 110 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, orig. pro-
ceeding), mand. denied by In Re Mitcham, 47 Tex. S. Ct. J. 374 (Mar. 26, 2004).
246. Id. at 64.
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ters & Kraus would not handle asbestos cases against TXU.247 When the
former legal assistant, now lawyer, subsequently left Waters & Kraus,
however, that firm filed an asbestos case against TXU.248 In considering
TXU's motion to disqualify, the Waco Court of Appeals held that, since
the former employee was a lawyer while she was at Waters & Kraus, an
irrebuttable presumption existed that other attorneys at that firm had ac-
cess to the confidences of TXU she had obtained while working as a legal
assistant.249 Thus, even though she had left Waters & Kraus as well, that
firm was disqualified from representing its client in the asbestos case
against TXU.25
0
In Pollard v. Merkel,251 a divorce case, the trial court excluded the testi-
mony of Pollard's former attorney, Robert Holmes, whom Pollard had
subsequently sued for malpractice. 252 However, the trial court refused to
disqualify Merkel's attorney, Sally Bybee, who had previously worked as
an associate at Holmes' law firm, although not at the time Holmes was
representing Pollard.25 3 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that this latter
ruling was an abuse of discretion.2 54 The court quoted at length from
Bybee's opening statement at the trial of the divorce case, where she
previewed Holmes' expected testimony about Pollard's dishonesty.2 55
Although Bybee testified that she never discussed either the divorce case
or the malpractice case with anyone while she was employed at Holmes'
firm and never discussed the matter with Holmes after they both left that
firm, the appellate court concluded that Bybee's disqualification was re-
quired because she had sought out "the former client's confidential infor-
mation from her former law partner and use[d] it to the former client's
detriment when representing the opposing party in the very same
case. "256
A party's sharing of confidential information about a lawsuit with its
liability insurer lead to a disqualification in In re Skiles.2 57 There, a home
seller was sued for misrepresentation and, in turn, filed suit against his
insurer for refusing to defend. 258 During the course of the coverage suit,
the seller's attorneys had discussions with the insurer's counsel for the
two-fold purpose of reporting on the status of the fraud case and facilitat-
ing settlement of the coverage case.259 The coverage case did in fact set-
tle, and thereafter the attorney for the homebuyer in the fraud case
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 66.
250. Id. at 66-67.
251. Pollard v. Merkel, 114 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
252. Id. at 697.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 703.
255. Id. at 697.
256. Id. at 702.
257. In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding).




joined the firm that had represented the insurer in the coverage case.2 60
The Beaumont Court of Appeals construed the relationship between the
seller and the insurer as being in the nature of a "joint defense," notwith-
standing their obvious adversity in the coverage suit, so as to allow the
sharing of privileged information about the fraud case.261 Thus, the court
concluded that the homebuyer's law firm, which had previously repre-
sented the insurer, should have been disqualified. 262
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
The enforcement of arbitration provisions continues to be a hot topic.
In MacGregor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc.,263 the court found that a
party who was not a signatory to an arbitration agreement was nonethe-
less bound by the terms of that agreement. 264 Ingalls Ship Building con-
tracted with MacGregor to build elevator trunks to be used in a cruise
ship. MacGregor subcontracted part of the job to Unidynamics. The
contract between MacGregor and Unidynamics contained an arbitration
provision. Subsequently, Unidynamics contracted with Kellogg, Brown
& Root ("KBR"), which agreed to perform certain services in connection
with building the elevator trunks. The contract between Unidynamics
and KBR did not contain an agreement to arbitrate. After the party who
had ordered the ship from Ingalls declared bankruptcy, "a dispute arose
between MacGregor and Unidynamics regarding payment of [certain]
storage costs and KBR's refusal to release the trunks. '265 The dispute
between MacGregor and Unidynamics ultimately was the subject of an
arbitration proceeding. While the arbitration proceeding was progress-
ing, both MacGregor and Unidynamics demanded that KBR release the
trunks. In response, KBR filed suit against Unidynamics, "seeking a de-
claratory judgment regarding which party had title to the trunks. '266
MacGregor filed a motion to compel KBR's joinder in the arbitration
between itself and Unidynamics. 267
The First District Houston Court of Appeals found that KBR was com-
pelled to join its claims in the arbitration. 268 First, the court recognized
that "Texas law does not favor a multiplicity of claims and suits," and that
"arbitration provides a speedy and inexpensive alternative to litiga-
tion. '269 Second, the court held that there were several theories of law
and equity that provide a basis for compelling non-signatories to an arbi-
tration agreement to arbitrate their claims, including "(1) incorporation
260. Id.
261. Id. at 326-27.
262. Id. at 327.
263. MacGregor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 126 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003) (orig. proceeding [mand. pending]).








by reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) veil piercing alter ego, and
(5) estoppel. ' '270 In this case, the court considered KBR's relationship to
MacGregor and Unidynamics to be "equivalent to the status of a donee,
assignee, or third-party beneficiary," with the result that KBR was sub-
ject to an arbitration clause in an agreement it did not sign.271
In In re C&H News Co.,272 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held
that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was sup-
ported only by an illusory promise.273 The arbitration agreement was
contained in an employee handbook, which specifically identified "the
types of claims and disputes that were covered by and excluded from the
agreement to arbitrate." 274 The employee handbook further provided
that the content "may, and likely will, be changed, modified, deleted, or
amended from time to time as the [employer] deems appropriate, with or
without prior notification to employees. '275 Based on the foregoing, the
court concluded that the employer had reserved the right to unilaterally
amend the handbook and, therefore, had reserved the right to also unilat-
erally amend the arbitration policies and procedures contained in that
handbook. 276 Thus, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement
was not supported by valid consideration or mutuality of obligation.277
In In re Walkup, 278 the First District Houston Court of Appeals consid-
ered the proper way to calculate the fourteen day period under Rule
680.279 The trial court granted a temporary restraining order on January
30, 2003 at 2:30 p.m., and the parties disagreed as to whether the TRO
expired on February 13 at 2:30 p.m., which was fourteen twenty-four-hour
periods after it was granted, or on February 13 at midnight, which was
fourteen calendar days after it was granted. 280 The court held that the
TRO expired at midnight on February 13 because, among other reasons,
the term "day" ordinarily means a calendar day, which is the "[twenty-
four]-hour period of time beginning immediately after midnight of the
previous day and ending at the next midnight. '281 Moreover, the court
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. In re C&H News Co., No. 13-02-529-CV, 2003 WL 131770 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi, Jan. 16, 2003, orig. proceeding).
273. Id. at *4.
274. Id. at *3.
275. Id.
276. Id. at *34.
277. Id. at *4.
278. In re Walkup, 122 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig.
proceeding).
279. TEX. R. Civ. P. 680 provides, in part, the following:
Each temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed
with the date and hour of issuance; . . . and shall expire by its terms within
such time after signing, not to exceed fourteen days, as the court fixes, unless
within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a
like period.
280. Walkup, 122 S.W.3d at 215.
281. Id. at 217.
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concluded that if it interpreted Rule 680 to require fourteen twenty-four-
hour periods, trial courts would be required to schedule their daily docket
around very specific temporal deadlines, which would be undesirable.282
282. Id. at 218.
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